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ABSTRACT
In recent years, frivolous and inefficient multijurisdictional
stockholder litigation has become a costly burden on corporations in
the United States. A popular solution among boards of directors has
been to adopt bylaws with forum selection provisions (which require
certain disputes to be litigated before one forum). Those who
oppose this solution have challenged these provisions on the grounds
that they were passed as bylaws—which are unilaterally adopted by
boards without stockholder consent. These challengers argue that
bylaws are like contracts, and, therefore, require the mutual assent of
both stockholders and the corporation to be enforceable. This
argument implicates a classic theory of corporate law—the
contractarian theory—but vastly oversimplifies the relationship
between a stockholder, her corporation and the board of directors.
When the contractarian theory of corporate law is applied to the full
legal and practical reality of that relationship, the mutual assent
argument falls apart and the contractarian theory is shown to support
the enforceability of bylaws.
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INTRODUCTION
On September 29, 2010, the board of directors of Chevron
Corporation, a Delaware corporation headquartered in San Ramon,
California, adopted and amended a bylaw establishing the Delaware
Court of Chancery as the exclusive forum for certain intra-entity
actions.1 The bylaw reads:
Unless the Corporation consents in writing to the selection of an
alternative forum, the Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware
shall be the sole and exclusive forum for (i) any derivative action or
proceeding brought on behalf of the Corporation, (ii) any action
asserting a claim of breach of a fiduciary duty owed by any director,
officer or other employee of the corporation to the Corporation or
the Corporation’s stockholders, (iii) any action asserting a claim
arising pursuant to any provision of the Delaware General
Corporation Law, or (iv) any action asserting a claim governed by
the internal affairs doctrine. Any person or entity purchasing or
otherwise acquiring any interest in shares of capital stock of the
Corporation shall be deemed to have notice of and consented to the
2
provisions of this [bylaw].

In early 2012, lawsuits were filed in the Delaware Chancery Court
against twelve major Delaware corporations that had passed forum
selection bylaws like Chevron’s.3 The suits, filed by plaintiffs’ lawyers
on behalf of stockholders, challenged the validity of the bylaws on a

1. See Verified Complaint at 22, Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron
Corp., No. 7220 (Del. Ch. Feb. 6, 2012) [hereinafter Chevron Complaint].
2. Id. at 6–7.
3. Marc A. Alpert & Patrick J. Narvaez, Continuing Challenges to Exclusive
Forum Bylaw Provisions, in CHADBOURNE & PARKE LLP, CORPORATE PRACTICE
NEWSWIRE 2 (Sept. 2012), available at http://www.chadbourne.com/files/Publication/
d9847614-a7b3-4164-9cf9-973e92ab2299/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/
0baecf9c-db50-4f90-89bf-c6a17e3d215c/
ContinuingChallengestoExclusiveForumBylawProvisions_Alpert_DealLawyers.pdf.
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number of grounds, including: (1) that they were overbroad, (2) that
they conflicted with other provisions of Delaware Law, (3) that they
conferred upon the Chancery Court exclusive jurisdiction over all
stockholders regardless of personal or subject matter jurisdiction, (4)
that they were neither reasonable nor equitable, and (5) that they were
unenforceable under contract law because they were unilaterally adopted
by the boards and thus lacked the requisite mutual consent of the
stockholders.4
In response, ten of the companies repealed their forum selection
bylaws, mooting their cases.5 The two remaining companies, Chevron
and FedEx, had their cases consolidated and are currently before
Chancellor Leo Strine, Jr. of the Delaware Court of Chancery.6 On June
25, 2013, Chancellor Strine issued an opinion granting the defendants’
motion to dismiss on two counts of the plaintiffs’ complaints: Count I,
that the bylaws are statutorily invalid because they exceed the board’s
authority under Delaware statutory law and Count IV, that the bylaws
are contractually invalid because they lack the mutual assent of the
stockholders.7 The decision is likely to be appealed.8

4. Chevron Complaint, supra note 1, at 2–8.
5. Alpert & Narvaez, supra note 3, at 3.
6. Chevron amended its bylaws to moot the subject matter and personal
jurisdiction allegations. In its amended form, the bylaw reads in relevant part, “the sole
and exclusive forum . . . shall be a state or federal court located within the state of
Delaware, in all cases subject to the court’s having personal jurisdiction over the
indispensable parties named as defendants.” Chevron Corp., Bylaws of Chevron
Corporation (Mar. 27, 2013), available at http://www.chevron.com/documents/pdf/
chevronbylaws.pdf (emphasis added). Fed Ex’s Bylaw remains unchanged. FedEx
Corp., FedEx Corporation: Amended and Restated Bylaws (Sept. 26, 2011), available
at http://investors.fedex.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=73289&p=irol-govbylaws. See also
Tom Hals, Shareholders Attack Sue-in-Delaware Bylaws, THOMSON REUTERS NEWS &
INSIGHT, Apr. 11, 2013, http://newsandinsight.thomsonreuters.com/Securities/News/
2013/04_-_April/Shareholders_attack_sue-in-Delaware_bylaws/. In his recent opinion,
Chancellor Strine noted that “[b]ecause the two bylaws are similar, present common
legal issues, and are the target of near-identical complaints, the court decided to address
them together.” See Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 2013 WL
3191981, at *1 (Del. Ch. June 25, 2013).
7.
See generally Chevron, 2013 WL 3191981, supra note 6.
8.
Delaware Court of Chancery Upholds Validity of Board-Adopted Forum
Selection Bylaws, WSGR ALERT, (Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati), June 25, 2013,
available at http://www.wsgr.com/WSGR/Display.aspx?SectionName=publications/
PDFSearch/wsgralert-forum-selection-bylaws.htm.
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The Chevron plaintiffs’ argument that the bylaws were
unenforceable under contract law is an outgrowth of a legal and
economic theory of corporate law that classifies the relationship
between the stockholder, the board of directors, and the corporation as
contractual. 9 This legal classification and the suggestion that mutual
assent is necessary to enforce the “corporate contract” are the subjects of
my interest, and the topic of this paper. I will proceed in three parts.
First, I will discuss the current controversy surrounding the forum
selection bylaw; second, I will explore the contractarian theory of
corporate law; and third, I will analyze the mutual assent arguments
made in the Chevron litigation in light of this theory, Delaware state
law, federal law, and relevant academic commentary. My conclusion is
that, subject to the caveat that they not be applied retroactively, validly
adopted forum selection bylaws are an enforceable part of the corporate
contract.
I. THE FORUM SELECTION BYLAW
The impetus for the adoption of the forum selection bylaw
provision was a comment made in dicta by Vice Chancellor Laster in In
re Revlon, Inc. Shareholders Litigation, that, “if boards of directors and
stockholders believe that a particular forum would provide an efficient
and value-promoting locus for dispute resolutions, then corporations are
free to respond with charter provisions selecting an exclusive forum for
intra-entity disputes.” 10 The attempt by boards of directors to use
bylaws as opposed to charter provisions to enact exclusive forum
selection provisions has given rise to a lively dispute among
practitioners and scholars over the last few years.
The debate is particularly contentious because the costs of
defending duplicative and frivolous multijurisdictional stockholder
lawsuits have, in recent years, become increasingly high.11 For example,
a recent study found that in the six-year period from 2005 to 2011, the
9. See generally Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate
Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1416 (1989).
10. In re Revlon, Inc. S’holders Litig., 990 A.2d 940, 960 (Del. Ch. 2010)
11. Alison Frankel, El Paso Shapes Up as Latest M&A Shareholder Venue Fight,
THOMSON
REUTERS
NEWS
&
INSIGHT,
Oct.
21,
2011,
http://newsandinsight.thomsonreuters.com/Legal/News/2011/10_-_October/El_Paso_
case_shapes_up_as_latest_M_A_shareholder_venue_fight/.
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percentage of mergers and acquisitions-related lawsuits brought in
multiple jurisdictions increased by 44.7% (from 8.3% to 53%).12 The
problem is that engaging corporations in numerous multijurisdictional
lawsuits, in transaction-related litigation, for example, rarely results in
increased value (in terms of price-per-share) for stockholders, but rather,
results directly in increased fees for plaintiffs’ attorneys.13 The use of
exclusive forum selection provisions, whether by charter or bylaw, is a
means to cut down on these costs.
It is also important, however, to subject corporations to the review
that comes from litigation (or, the threat of litigation). And this is the
normative argument made by opponents of forum selection clauses—
that the vulnerability to suit in multiple jurisdictions subjects
corporations to an important check. But again, the problem is the
enormous agency costs created by the plaintiffs’ attorneys’ incentive to
file as many suits as possible; the costs of the lawsuits are born by
stockholders, but the benefits—at the least the benefits of filing and then
consolidating a multitude of suits—go to the plaintiffs’ attorneys.14 And
for plaintiffs’ attorneys, Delaware is not an appealing state to litigate in.
As two practitioners note:
Plaintiffs’ attorneys are particularly motivated to file outside of
Delaware on the belief that courts in other jurisdictions are less
likely to dismiss weaker claims and limit attorneys fee awards.
Companies may also be more inclined to settle suits filed outside of
Delaware due to the likelihood that Delaware law will be misapplied
15
in other, less corporate-savvy jurisdictions.

12. Matthew D. Cain & Steven M. Davidoff, A Great Game: The Dynamics of
State Competition and Litigation 13–14, 35 (Jan. 13, 2013) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1984758.
13. Brian JM Quinn, Shareholder Lawsuits, Status Quo Bias, and Adoption of the
Exclusive Forum Provision, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 137, 165 (2011).
14. Id.
15. Frank J. Aquila & Anna M. Kripitz, Designating Delaware: The Rise of
Exclusive Forum Selection Provisions, PRACTICAL L.J., Oct. 2012, at 3–4, available at
http://us.practicallaw.com/0-521-5321. The fervent anti-Delaware position taken by
plaintiffs’ attorneys is also attributable to a belief “that Delaware judges don’t give
shareholders and their lawyers a fighting chance.” See Alison Frankel, Strine to M&A
Bar: Don’t Stop Believing . . . in Delaware, THOMSON REUTERS NEWS & INSIGHT (Nov.
14, 2011), http://newsandinsight.thomsonreuters.com/Legal/News/2011/11_-_
November/Strine_to_M_A_bar__Don_t_stop_believing_____in_Delaware/.
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The exclusive forum selection provision, whether implemented by
bylaw or charter, appears to be a middle ground solution. As Brian
Quinn suggests: “[b]y limiting litigation to a single forum, firms and
shareholders can still subject themselves to review, but in the case of
Delaware, also benefit from the court’s interest in policing litigation
agency costs.”16
Regardless of the underlying motivations or whether corporations
should adopt exclusive forum selection clauses, let us take a look at the
economic and legal theory behind the contractual classification of the
corporate relationship.
II. THE CORPORATE CONTRACT
This section will proceed in three parts. First, it will explore the
economic and legal aspects of the contractarian theory of corporate law.
Second, it will review the doctrine of mutual assent under general
contract law. And third, it will analyze whether bylaws are an
enforceable part of the corporate contract under Delaware state law and
federal contract law, using the forum selection bylaw cases as an
example.
A. THE CONTRACTARIAN THEORY OF CORPORATE LAW
1. The Economic Theory
The courts and the academic community have, for many years,
broadly conceptualized the relationship between the stockholders, the
board of directors, and the corporation as contractual in nature. 17
Incorporators draft certain promises in the charter, which stockholders
then assent to at a certain price (determined by the market’s perception
of the corporation’s value). 18 As discussed in detail below, the
voluntary choice of entering into a contractual relationship with the
corporation, by purchasing shares subject to the charter, represents a
16. Quinn, supra note 13, at 165.
17. See, e.g., Ellingwood v. Wolf’s Head Oil Ref. Co., 38 A.2d 743, 747 (Del.
1944) (finding that stockholder rights are contract rights); see generally Easterbrook &
Fischel, supra note 9.
18. See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 17–22 (Harvard Univ. Press 1996) (1991).
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contract.19 The underlying economic theory is based on this idea that a
corporation will enter into and adapt a complex series of voluntary
relationships with third parties to optimize its efficiency.20 That is:
To say that a complex relation among many voluntary participants is
adaptive is to say that it is contractual. Thus [the] reference to the
corporation as a set of contracts. Voluntary arrangements are
contracts. Some may be negotiated over a bargaining table. Some
may be a set of terms that are dictated (by managers or investors)
and accepted or not; only the price is negotiated. Some may be fixed
and must be accepted at the going price (as when people buy
investments traded in the market) . . . . The result of all of these
21
voluntary arrangements will be contractual.

This theory, developed and applied in the late 1980s by Frank
Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel, suggests that over time the open market
will direct these contractual relationships, including the promises 22 in
each corporation’s charter, to reflect the most efficient and optimal
structure. 23 This process of adaptation will continue with the market
driving efficiently structured corporations to flourish and those with
inefficient structures to fail.
There are a number of criticisms levied against this economic
theory. Particularly, there is criticism that it is premised on invalid
market assumptions—that the market has low-to-zero transaction
costs. 24 Critics argue that there are externalities and other costs that
impede contracting, making this model unrealistic. 25 Several studies
19. See infra Part II.A.2.
20. Id. at 14.
21. Id.
22. Among the promises incorporators must choose from are the state laws under
which the company will operate. Those states with efficient corporate laws will be
favored. In the United States today, the market has driven most major corporations into
Delaware.
23. See generally Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 9.
24. Michael Klausner, The Contractarian Theory of Corporate Law: A Generation
Later, 31 J. CORP. L. 779, 781–82, 796–97 (2006) (“The theory was based largely on
perfect market assumptions and lacked empirical support. . . . The positive implication
is that there are apparently impediments to contracting that may undermine the valuemaximizing claim of the theory and the theory’s minimalist view of corporate law.”).
25. Id. at 782, 784–91. This characterization is rather misleading, however.
Easterbrook and Fischel argue that the diversity among corporations should exist not in
the charters alone, but in the entire corporate structure (i.e., throughout all the
“contractual” relationships). See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 18, at 12–13.
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have shown empirically that the basic structure of corporate charters is
nearly uniform across the board.26 For some scholars, this uniformity
(or the absence of diversity among charters) is proof that “as a
description of reality, or a basis for policy prescription, the theory falls
short.”27
2. The Legal Theory
The legal classification of a corporation’s complex series of
voluntary relationships as contractual, however, does not require
quantifiable diversity among corporate charters. Nor does it require the
assumption of a market with low-to-zero transaction costs. Casting
aside normative arguments about what form corporate law should take
and positive arguments about how the market drives or has driven the
contracting process, there is a far simpler take-away from the
contractarian theory of corporate law. This legal classification is not
novel: it is discussed at length in Easterbrook and Fischel’s 1989 “The
Corporate Contract.” It is, in part, the basis for the only federal decision
to tackle the forum selection bylaw (the Northern District of California’s
Galaviz decision in 2011, discussed below),28 it is implicit in the mutual
assent argument made in the Chevron complaint and, indeed, it is a
primary motivator of Chancellor Strine’s recent dismissal of Count IV
of the plaintiffs’ complaint.
The charter of a corporation, at its most basic level, is a contract.29
The incorporators draft its provisions and the stockholders determine its
price. 30 After execution in its initial public offering and subsequent
secondary offerings, different parties enter and leave the relationship, all
And this very clearly exists—take for example the oft-taught business school
comparison between 3M, in the 1970s and 80s, and Exxon, in the 1960s; or between
JetBlue and Delta in the commercial airline industry. Although these corporations’
charters are nearly identical, their structures and strategies differ greatly. It is this
diversity among the relationships of participants to which Easterbrook and Fischel were
likely alluding. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 18, at 13.
26. Klausner, supra note 24, at 782, 786–89.
27. Id. at 779.
28. See infra Part II.C.2.
29. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 18, at 16 (“The terms present in the
articles of incorporation at the time the firm is established or issues stock are real
agreements.”).
30. Id. at 17–22.
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pursuant to the charter. The parties’ obligations and promises (terms)
change from time to time as the charter is amended, which is reflected in
the fluctuating share price.31 These terms are legally binding and are
governed by the laws of a particular state.
However, when the base contract (the charter) grants one party the
power to unilaterally adopt new terms (bylaws), a question arises as to
whether those terms form a part of the base contract, or fail for lack of
mutual assent. The scope of this inquiry can be narrowed further in light
of the statutory and common law limits on bylaws—(i) that they not
conflict with the charter and (ii) that the drafters (the board) are subject
to certain fiduciary duties (discussed below) 32. This was the question
put to the Chancery Court in its consideration of the defendants’ motion
to dismiss Count IV, which is implicit in the mutual assent argument.
B. MUTUAL ASSENT
An enforceable contract requires, among other things, an offer,
acceptance, consideration, and in many circumstances, mutual assent (or
a “meeting of the minds”).33 Indeed, “many doctrines of contract law
ensure that an enforceable contract exists only when parties mutually
consented to it, and not when parties did not mutually consent to it.”34
Modifying an existing contract typically also requires mutual
assent. Generally, one party may not, by itself, rewrite an existing
contract at some later time and expect those modifications to be
enforceable against the other party. Contract modifications often require
new consideration from both parties. This new consideration can itself
be a modification of existing obligations, such as an increase in the
performance obligations of one party or the acceptance of a reduction of
the obligations of the other party. That is, “[o]ne-sided contract
modifications—where only one side’s obligation changes—are
31. Id.
32. See infra Part II.C.1.
33. I say “in many circumstances” because there are some circumstances where
mutual assent is not required, and therefore, there will be no “meeting of the minds.”
For example, if a person makes a statement intended to dupe another party into some
sort of legal detriment, or makes a firm offer but no longer wishes to be bound, a party
may be bound against her will. See ERIC POSNER, CONTRACT LAW & THEORY 133
(2011) (citing Lefkowitz v. Great Minneapolis Surplus Store, Inc., 86 N.W.2d 689
(Minn. 1957); Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Co., [1893], 1 Q.B. 256 (U.K.)).
34. Id. at 41. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 17(1) (1981).
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vulnerable to challenges on various grounds. . . .”35 This is the simplest
explanation of the plaintiffs’ mutual assent argument in Chevron. They
argue that the bylaws are a contract and that one party, in this case the
board, may not unilaterally modify them without the assent of the other
party, in this case the stockholders.36 As will be shown, this concept of
mutual assent in the context of bylaws is a red herring—the bylaws are
only one part of a larger contract formed with sufficient mutual assent,
which allows for certain, limited, unilateral modifications (a mechanism
which is not unusual in contract law, or the real world).
C. ARE BYLAWS A PART OF THE CORPORATE CONTRACT?
In the Chevron complaint, the plaintiffs argue that bylaws are not a
part of the corporate contract because they lack mutual assent. Count IV
alleges:
There was no element of mutual consent to the forum choice
imposed by the Bylaw unilaterally by the Directors without any
notice to the stockholders or any opportunity to reject the Bylaw.
The Bylaw represented a unilateral change to the provisions of the
bylaws that the Company would not have been able to accomplish
under ordinary principles of contract law. . . . Under contract law,
the Board could not unilaterally amend the contract. The bylaws
cannot be amended as a matter of corporate law in a manner that
37
could not be achieved under contract law.

With respect to the mutual assent argument, the complaint punts on
the issue of enforceability under Delaware corporate law by arguing that
unless it would be lawful under contract law, it cannot be lawful under
state corporate law.38 The first court to consider this issue, the Northern
District of California, also punted in the 2012 Galaviz 39 case by
assuming the bylaw’s validity under Delaware state law and jumping

35. POSNER, supra note 33, at 32.
36. Chevron Complaint, supra note 1, at 3, 21–22.
37. Chevron Complaint, supra note 1, at 21–22.
38. A number of the complaint’s other arguments, however, center on
enforceability under the DGCL, but for the purposes of the mutual assent argument they
punt.
39. Galaviz v. Berg, 763 F. Supp. 2d 1170 (N.D. Cal. 2011).
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right into an analysis of contract law (discussed below).40 Chancellor
Strine addressed enforceability under Delaware Law in his opinion—
finding that forum selection bylaws are enforceable.41 And because the
corporate contract does not exist in a vacuum, but within the laws of a
particular state, it is important to factor in the relevant statutory law.
1. Delaware Statutory Law
Section 109(a) of the Delaware General Corporation Law
(“DGCL”) explicitly allows boards and stockholders to unilaterally
adopt bylaws when authorized in a corporation’s charter: “any
corporation may, in its certificate of incorporation, confer the power to
adopt, amend or repeal bylaws upon the directors.” 42 Nearly all
corporate charters utilize this rule, as bylaws are an important part of
how the board manages the company’s day-to-day operations; requiring
stockholder consent for mundane issues would defeat the efficiency of
corporate structure.43
Section 109(b) then limits the content of bylaws to “any provision,
not inconsistent with the law or with the certificate of incorporation,
relating to the business of the corporation, the conduct of its affairs, and
its right or powers or the rights or powers of its stockholders, directors,
officers or employees.” 44 Section 141(a) further limits the board’s
power to adopt, amend, and repeal bylaws to matters concerning “[t]he
business and affairs of [the] corporation.”45
Although the board’s power to unilaterally pass bylaws is broader
than that of stockholders, CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Employees Pension
Plan,46 Section 109(a), and case law are also clear that stockholders may

40. See infra Part II.C.2.
41. See Chevron, 2013 WL 3191981, supra note 6, at *2.
42. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(a) (2010).
43. Indeed, the suggestion that bylaws are somehow unenforceable for lack of
mutual assent would “turn Delaware corporate law on its ear.” Joseph A. Grundfest &
Kristen A. Savelle, The Brouhaha Over Intra-Corporate Forum Selection Provisions: A
Legal, Economic, and Political Analysis, 68 BUS. LAW. 325 (2013) (manuscript at 5),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2164324.
44. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(b) (2010).
45. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2010).
46. 953 A.2d 227 (Del. 2008) (limiting the scope of stockholders’ ability to pass
bylaws that tie directors’ hands).
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trump any board-passed bylaw by enacting a stockholder bylaw or
charter amendment.47
So, in a case like Chevron’s where the charter authorizes its board
to adopt bylaws on its own in satisfaction of Section 109(a), the Board
need only appropriately exercise this right—in terms of adopting the
Bylaw and narrowing its scope to inter-entity disputes as allowed under
Sections 109(b) and 141(a)—to avoid running afoul of Delaware Law.
At dispute in Chevron, aside from the lack of mutual assent, is, in
Count I, the extent to which the bylaw is narrow enough to fit within
Sections 109(b) and 141(a)’s limitations. 48 Although this inquiry is
valid, given the opinions of several well-respected scholars and the
Delaware Chancery Court’s own decision upholding an exclusive
foreign jurisdiction forum selection provision, it was no surprise that
Chancellor Strine easily found the bylaw to be within the limits of
Delaware law.49
Under Delaware law, boards of directors are also bound by certain
fiduciary duties. 50 These fiduciary duties of care and of loyalty are
owed to both the corporation and the stockholders and are akin to those
of a trustee. 51 “Directors of [a] corporation are trustees for the
47. Unisuper Ltd. v. News Corp., No. 1699-N, 2005 WL 3529317 (Del. Ch. Dec.
20, 2005) (describing the board’s power as that of an agent’s).
48. Chevron Complaint, supra note 1, at 15–18.
49. See Baker v. Impact Holding, Inc., No. 4960-VCP, 2010 WL 1931032 (Del.
Ch. May 13, 2010) (upholding a forum selection clause in a stockholders’ agreement
mandating exclusive forum in Texas); Grundfest & Savelle, supra note 43, at 42–45;
Stephen M. Davidoff, A Litigation Plan That Would Favor Delaware, DEALBOOK (Oct.
26, 2010, 9:30 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/10/26/a-litigation-plan-thatwould-favor-delaware/ (discussing a similarly worded and structured bylaw provision).
Chancellor Strine, in his most recent opinion, does not expressly address Section
141(a), however, given the ease with which he dispensed of the plaintiffs’ 109(b)
arguments, he almost certainly (indeed impliedly) would hold that the bylaws are
proper under 141(a). See Chevron, 2013 WL 3191981, supra note 6, at *2 (“The forum
selection bylaws, which govern disputes related to the “internal affairs” of the
corporations, easily meet [the] requirements [of Section 109(b)].”).
50. See, e.g., World Health Alts., Inc. v. McDonald (In re World Health Alts.,
Inc.), 385 B.R. 576 (Bankr. D. Del. 2008).
51. See Bovay v. H.M. Byllesby & Co., 38 A.2d 808, 813 (Del. 1944); Loft, Inc. v.
Guth, 2 A.2d 225, 238 (Del. Ch. 1938), aff’d, 5 A.2d 503 (Del. 1939). “Directors of
corporation stand in fiduciary relation to corporation and its stockholders. Their acts are
subject to be tested by the familiar rules that govern the relations of a trustee to the
trustee’s beneficiary.” DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141, Notes to Decision – Officers
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stockholders, and their acts are governed by the rules applicable to such
a relation, which exact of them the utmost good faith and fair dealing,
especially where their individual interests are concerned.” 52 These
fiduciary duties will also limit the extent to which the board may
unilaterally adopt new terms to the corporate contract. The duties that
directors owe to stockholders include acting uninterestedly, in good
faith, and on an informed basis.53
The directors’ duty to act on an informed basis is evidenced by the
well-known rationale behind forum selection bylaws: that they, at least
in theory, reduce non-value added corporate litigation expenses, thereby
increasing stockholder value. Of course, an argument could also be
made that the adoption of the bylaw was in “bad faith” or an “interested
decision” insofar as it was done for the purposes of “ensur[ing] a
hearing before judges likely to defer to management decisions.”54 But
given (i) the latitude granted to boards to make business decisions with
“any rational business purpose” (the “business judgment rule”)55 and (ii)
the presumption that boards of directors act in good faith56 (combined
with the lack of evidence presented by defendants, who hold the burden
of proof)57 suggest that this argument would not hold water.
Chancellor Strine did not address the fiduciary duty argument in his
opinion, as no evidence of improper purpose was presented to the court.

Powers and Duties (LexisNexis 2013); Bowen v. Imperial Theatres, Inc., 115 A. 918,
922 (Del. Ch. 1922). But see Gottlieb v. McKee, 107 A.2d 240, 243 (Del. Ch. 1954)
(stating that corporate officers and directors are not technically trustees).
52. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141, Notes to Decision – Officers Powers and Duties
(LexisNexis 2013).
53. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1986) (discussing the
requirements for a decision of a board of directors to qualify for deference under the
business judgment rule).
54. Chevron Fights 2-Front War Over Where Shareholders can Sue, WESTLAW J.,
Apr. 23, 2012, at 12, available at http://www.ngelaw.com/files/News/65c36e09-edc142dd-8620-234823bb0b5b/Presentation/NewsAttachment/6efe59f2-be72-4fbb-881f5278d2cecd20/nge_Claudia%20Allen%20in%20Corporate%20Officers%20%20Direct
ors%20Liability%20re%20Chevron_04%2023%2012.pdf.
55. Kaplan v. Goldsamt, 380 A.2d 556, 568 (Del. Ch. 1977).
56. Gimbel v. Signal Cos., 316 A.2d 599, 608 (Del. Ch. 1974), aff’d, 316 A.2d 619
(Del. 1974).
57. See Maldonado v. Flynn, 413 A.2d 1251, 1254 (Del. Ch. 1980), rev’d on other
grounds sub nom. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981).
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This is further evidence that, by itself, the passing of a forum selection
bylaw conforms to the fiduciary requirements placed on directors.58
The question then turns to federal contract law and the extent to
which a bylaw requires mutual assent to be binding upon stockholders—
or, whether bylaws are a part of the corporate contract at all.
2. Contract Law: Federal Precedent
This issue has only come before one federal court: a 2012 case
before Judge Richard Seeborg in the Northern District of California.59
Without deciding on validity under Delaware law, the Northern District
refused to uphold a forum selection bylaw on the grounds that, even if
the adoption of the bylaw was lawful under Delaware law, it was not
enforceable under federal common law.60 The court held that, “under
contract law, a party’s consent to a written agreement may serve as
consent to all the terms therein, whether or not all of them were
specifically negotiated or even read, but it does not follow that a
contracting party may thereafter unilaterally add or modify contractual
provisions.” 61 The court adopted the legal theory that the charter
represented a contract between the stockholders and the board, and that
the bylaw was an unenforceable unilateral amendment to that contract.
In Galaviz, the board of directors of Oracle allegedly anticipated
liability for fraudulently overcharging the government on certain of the
company’s contracts, and in response, adopted a forum selection bylaw
to limit the impending litigation to the Delaware Chancery Court.62 The
Northern District explained: “[h]ere . . . the venue provision was
unilaterally adopted by the directors who are defendants in this action,
after the majority of the purported wrongdoing is alleged to have
occurred, and without the consent of existing shareholders who acquired

58. See Chevron, 2013 WL 3191981, supra note 6, at *16 (stating that a “[a
proper] plaintiff may also argue that, under [Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 285
A.2d 437 (Del. 1971)] the forum selection clause should not be enforced because the
bylaw was being used for improper purposes inconsistent with directors’ fiduciary
duties” but that such a situation was not presented to the court in this case).
59. See Galaviz v. Berg, 763 F. Supp. 2d 1170 (N.D. Cal. 2011).
60. See id. at 1174-75.
61. Id. at 1174.
62. See id. at 1171–72.
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their shares when no such bylaw was in effect.” 63 According to the
Northern District, the directors had unclean hands.
The decision was controversial both legally and factually. As two
scholars ask:
How is it a violation of a fiduciary duty to adopt a bylaw stating that
intra-corporate litigation involving a Delaware corporation (even if
the potential allegation is known to the board) is to be adjudicated in
Delaware under Delaware law? The directors do not avoid any
liability by adopting this rule, and are Delaware courts not to be
trusted when it comes to enforcing fiduciary duties? The court’s
reliance on the underlying sequence of events thus rests on critical
unproven assumptions of fact and operates through a mysterious,
64
undescribed principle of law.

A priori, however, the Court’s underlying concern is valid—the
adoption and then retroactive application of a bylaw has the effect of
subjecting stockholders to terms to which they did not consent, and
more importantly, to which they could not take reversing or
ameliorating action (which will be explored in detail below).65 As two
practitioners suggest: “[h]ad [the company’s] bylaws included a forum
selection clause prior to any alleged wrongdoing . . . the district court
may have come to a different conclusion.”66
The Galaviz decision, then, turned on two grounds: (1) the legal
classification of the adoption of a bylaw as an amendment to a contract
that required mutual assent and (2) the retroactive effect of the bylaw.
As will be shown, the first argument is incomplete because it does
not consider the permission granted to the board in the charter to take
certain unilateral action, and the second makes the case easily
distinguishable from Chevron.67 Indeed, Chancellor Strine quickly set
aside the Galaviz decision because it “rests on a failure to appreciate the
contractual framework established by the DGCL for Delaware

63. Id. at 1174.
64. Grundfest & Savelle, supra note 43, at 76.
65. See infra Part II.C.3.
66. Client Memorandum from Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP, California Court
Rejects the Enforceability of a Delaware Forum Selection Clause in Corporate Bylaws
(Jan. 7, 2011), available at http://www.willkie.com/files/tbl_s29Publications%
5CFileUpload5686%5C3643%5CCalifornia-Court-Rejects-The-Enforceability.pdf.
67. Grundfest & Savelle, supra note 43, at 76 (regarding distinguishability).
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corporations and their stockholders.” 68 Still, the second ground of
Galaviz appears to require a qualification regarding the enforceability of
forum selection bylaws (at least under federal law), discussed in part
III.C.4.
3. Contract Law: Analysis
The Supreme Court has long held forum selection provisions to be
enforceable. In the seminal case, The Bremen v. Zapata Offshore Co.,69
the Court concluded that absent a strong showing “that enforcement
would be unreasonable and unjust, or that the clause was invalid for
such reasons as fraud or overreaching,” a “freely negotiated” forum
selection provision should not be set aside.70 Under federal law today,
forum selection provisions “are prima facie valid and [will] be enforced
unless enforcement is shown to be unreasonable under the
circumstances of the particular contract.”71
In the infamous Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute case, the
Supreme Court upheld an un-negotiated, unilaterally drafted form
contract containing a venue provision. 72 The Court noted that the
plaintiffs had conceded “they had notice of the clause and that they
therefore, ‘presumably retained the option of rejecting the contract with
impunity.’”73 The ability of a party to—at the very least—walk away
from a contract is important under the Supreme Court’s analysis.
The Galaviz court argued that unlike the plaintiffs in Carnival, the
plaintiffs in Galaviz never had the option to opt out of the contract
because it was retroactively applied.74 And, as discussed, this concern is
valid—it seems that even under Bremen, it could be considered
unreasonable to retroactively apply the bylaw provision. However,
recall that the Galaviz court argued more broadly: while “a party’s
consent to a written agreement may serve as consent to all the terms
68. Chevron, 2013 WL 3191981, supra note 6, at *14.
69. 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
70. Id. at 15.
71. 14D CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §
3803.1 (West 2013).
72. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991).
73. Galaviz v. Berg, 763 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1174 n.4 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (quoting
Carnival Cruise Lines, 499 U.S. at 595).
74. Galaviz, 763 F. Supp. 2d at 1174.
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therein , . . . it does not follow that a contracting party may thereafter
unilaterally add or modify contractual provisions.”75 Here is where the
analysis in Galaviz falls apart.
The problem is that the bylaw is not the contract. The bylaws, the
charter, and the laws of the state of incorporation must be considered
together. A company’s charter is the contract voluntarily entered into by
the parties and can only properly be modified by mutual assent (or in
corporate law terms, by a majority stockholder vote). This mutually
assented to contract contains many provisions, each of which is a “real
agreement.” 76 And, one of these agreements allows the board of
directors to unilaterally adopt bylaws, subject to certain statutory and
fiduciary limitations.
This type of contractual arrangement is not unique. For example,
requirements contracts under the Uniform Commercial Code allow for
quantity terms to be determined unilaterally by one party, subject to
certain contractual and statutory limitations.77 The ability of trustees to
take unilateral action regarding the disposition of assets of beneficiaries,
subject to certain statutory, fiduciary, and contractual limitations is
another example. In each of these paradigms, the power to take certain,
limited unilateral action is granted through mutual assent in an original,
underlying contract. 78 Few would argue that we should ignore the
underlying contractual relationship and focus exclusively on the
unilateral act. This notion that unilateral action, in and of itself, is
somehow a prima facie violation of contract law is misplaced.79 Parties

75. Id.
76. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 18, at 16 (“The corporate venture has
many real contracts. The terms present in the articles of incorporation at the time the
firm is established or issues stock are real agreements. Everything to do with the
relation between the firm and the suppliers of labor (employees), goods and services
(suppliers and contractors) is contractual.”).
77. See U.C.C. §§ 2-201, § 2-306 (2011).
78. This limitation is key because a contract in which (i) one party retains the
unlimited unilateral ability to modify the entire agreement or (ii) one party is obligated
to perform only if the other party “wants,” as opposed to “needs” (as in a requirements
contract), will certainly fail for lack of consideration.
79. “It is unimportant that [unilaterally adopted terms] may not be ‘negotiated’; the
pricing and testing mechanisms are all that matter . . . . This should come as no shock to
anyone familiar with the Coase Theorem.” EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 18, at
17.
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are free to contract as they wish, 80 and if the contract between the
stockholder, her company, and the board specifically allows for the
board to make certain unilateral decisions that (i) do not conflict with
the underlying contract; (ii) do not breach its fiduciary duties; and (iii)
are limited to certain statutory matters, why should they be estopped
from doing so?
Indeed as far back as the 1980s, during the development of the
underlying economic theory, Easterbrook and Fischel tackled this issue:
And of course the rules that govern how rules change are also real
contracts. The articles of incorporation typically allow changes to be
made by bylaw or majority vote . . . . Sometimes terms are not
negotiated directly but are simply promulgated, in the way auto
rental companies promulgate the terms of their rental contracts. The
entrepreneurs or managers may adopt a set of rules and say “take
81
them or leave them.” This is contracting nonetheless.

And just as it is unimportant whether the original terms of the
charter are “negotiated” at a table by the board and stockholders—recall
that stockholders control (i) whether they assent and (ii) the price they
pay to assent—the passing of bylaws within the statutory and fiduciary
limits need not be negotiated: stockholders may (i) reject the bylaws by
passing their own (in Delaware, under Section 109(a), which trump the
board’s bylaws) or (ii) sell their shares and walk (“take them or leave
them”).82 From the moment a stockholder purchases her shares, she is

80. The argument levied against the freedom of contract position in free market
ideologies is that it ignores the often extreme bargaining inequalities between the
parties—like for instance that between a single stockholder and a corporation. See Kent
Greenfield, THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW: FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS AND
PROGRESSIVE POSSIBILITIES 19 (2006). While bargaining inequalities absolutely exist,
the fact remains that even the participant with the least amount of leverage still has the
option to walk away—like in Carnival. The lack of this option, however, can be
problematic, as will be discussed, but, generally, even an inequality in leverage affords
the least well-off participant the ability to choose.
81. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 9, at 1429.
82. This is not a purely federal contract law rational—the Delaware Chancery
Court has adopted it as well. See In re MONY Group Inc. S’holder Litig., 853 A.2d 661
(Del. Ch. 2004) (stating that, generally, stockholders have only two protections against
the perceived inadequate business performance of their corporation: sell the stock or
vote to replace the directors).
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on notice that the charter grants the board the power to unilaterally adopt
bylaws, which will be binding on stockholders without their approval.83
Of course, a loss still exists. There is a cost borne by disapproving
stockholders even if they pass their own bylaw or sell their shares.
Taking any sort of collective stockholder action (like passing a bylaw or
initiating a proxy contest) is wrought with transaction costs, all of which
slow down the process considerably. During this time, the disapproving
stockholder must endure the bylaw and if this stockholder walks away,
she must also bear a cost. Assume the adoption of the forum selection
bylaw lowers the share price of a company’s stock: in order to walk
away, the disapproving stockholder must accept the lower price for her
share (even if the long-term result is a net gain in the share price).
Although this “latecomer term” situation presents a problem for
disapproving stockholders, the exact same problem exists in transactions
with the bylaw-specific mutual assent that the plaintiffs call for. 84
Suppose, instead, that the forum selection provision is adopted by
stockholder bylaw or charter amendment, unless the provision is passed
unanimously, a minority of stockholders will dissent. These dissenting
stockholders will face the same costs—if the share price falls as a result
and they choose to sell, they sell at a loss. The latecomer term problem
permeates all forms of corporate contractual modification—it is not
remedied by prohibiting unilateral board-adopted bylaws. What is
important to understand is that, even ignoring economics, after a bylaw
is lawfully adopted or amended, stockholders have both notice and the
ability to take reversing action or walk away—the same ability the
plaintiffs had in Carnival Cruise Lines. Indeed, in Chancellor Strine’s
recent opinion, he points out that stockholders have an additional level
of safety: “Unlike cruise ship passengers, who have no mechanism by
which to change their ticket’s terms and conditions, stockholders retain
the right to modify the corporation’s bylaws.”85
What’s puzzling about the Galaviz decision is how broadly the
court felt it had to rule. The court stated, “[the board] has not shown
federal law requires or even permits the federal courts to defer to any
provision of state corporate law that might purport to give a
corporation’s directors the power to control venue under the

83.
84.
85.

Grundfest & Savelle, supra note 43, at 48.
EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 18, at 32.
See Chevron, 2013 WL 3191981, supra note 6, at *15.
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circumstances discussed above.”86 However, this is because the court
does not need to defer to state corporate law. All it must do is
recognize the charter as the base contract between the parties. If it finds
the charter to be a validly enforceable contract, then the court should
recognize the power it grants to the board to take unilateral action that
conforms to the contractual limitations in the charter. This type of
unilateral action takes place every day in thousands of corporations
across the country, and it can all be categorized as contractual without
the need to defer to state corporate law.
Under Delaware case law, the analysis is the even clearer. Not only
has Delaware expressly adopted the Supreme Court’s position in
Bremen, 87 but the Chancery Court has expressly held that “bylaws
constitute a binding part of the contract between a Delaware corporation
and its stockholders.”88 This is a state corporate law position that has
been accepted by the Chancery Court for “several generations.” 89 In
1995, in Kidsco, the court stated: “It is undisputed that the
[corporation’s] certificate of incorporation expressly authorize[d] the
directors to amend or repeal the by-laws without obtaining stockholder
approval. Therefore, although the by-laws are a contract between the
corporation and its stockholders, the contract was subject to the board’s
power to amend the by-laws unilaterally.”90
Thus, even after we show that the adoption of a forum selection
bylaw is lawful under federal contract law and Delaware statutory and
case law (as Chancellor Strine held in his recent opinion), we still have
the situation in Galaviz where certain litigious acts or events that
occurred before the adoption of the bylaw are retroactively swept up
under the scope of the clause.

86. Galaviz v. Berg, 763 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1174, 1177 n. 4 (N.D. Cal. 2011).
87. Ingres Corp. v. CA, Inc., 8 A.3d 1143, 1146 (Del. 2010). Chancellor Strine
makes mention of this point several times in his recent opinion. Chevron, 2013 WL
3191981, supra note 6, at *6, *36.
88. “In an unbroken line of decisions dating back several generations, our Supreme
Court has made clear that the bylaws constitute a binding part of the contract between a
Delaware corporation and its stockholders.” See Chevron, 2013 WL 3191981, supra
note 6, at *14. See also, Grundfest & Savelle, supra note 43, at 48 “[The vested rights]
theory has been roundly rejected for decades by courts in Delaware and in California.”
89. Id. See also Kidsco, Inc. v. Dinsmore, 674 A.2d 483 (Del. Ch. 1995).
90. 674 A.2d at 492 (internal citations omitted).
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4. Contract Law: Qualification on Retroactive Application
In a scenario where a bylaw is passed that has an effect on acts or
events that occurred prior to the bylaw’s adoption, federal contract law
appears to require a qualification. This scenario was not before
Chancellor Strine in his considering of the defendants’ motion to
dismiss and therefore, he properly declined to address it and the “array
of purely hypothetical situations in which the bylaws of Chevron and
FedEx might operate unreasonably.” 91 We, however, are not so
constrained.
This retroactive application scenario would effectively impose the
new bylaw on wrongdoing that affected stockholders at a time when
they had neither the option to take reversing action nor the option to
walk away. In these circumstances, as was the case in Galaviz, the
federal common law appears not to support the retroactive application of
the bylaw—it would deny stockholders their reversing or ameliorating
rights, as required by Carnival, and could arguably (although,
tenuously) rise to the level of “unreasonable or unjust” as established in
Bremen.92
Therefore, for the bylaw to be applicable, it appears that federal
common law only requires that the underlying act or event of the cause
of action have occurred after the adoption of the forum selection
bylaw. 93 That being said, one could imagine a corporate charter
providing that the board may adopt bylaws with forward and backward
effect. This scenario would give rise to an interesting situation because
(1) such a bylaw would give stockholders the notice required by
Carnival, (2) there would be no contractual limitation in the charter, and
(3) assuming the provisions did not conflict with a different provision of
the charter, there would be no statutory violation under a state law
similar to Delaware’s Sections 109(b) and 141(a). A bylaw with such a
broad reach might trigger the unreasonability restriction in Bremen,
however absent a provision in the charter granting the board retroactive

91. See Chevron, 2013 WL 3191981, supra note 6, at *3 (“[I]t would be imprudent
and inappropriate to address these hypotheticals in the absence of a genuine controversy
with concrete facts. . . . Under our law, our Courts do not render advisory opinions
about hypothetical situations that may not occur.”).
92. See The Bremen v. Zapata Offshore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 15 (1972)
93. This point is not universally supported. See Grundfest & Savelle, supra note
43, at 75.
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powers, federal common law likely limits the reach of forum selection
bylaws to acts and events occurring after its adoption.
In sum, in Chevron’s case, it is clear that (i) under Delaware law
the adoption of the bylaw was valid and enforceable and (ii) under the
federal contract law, as articulated by the Supreme Court, the bylaw is
enforceable. Only if a cause of action is rooted in an act or event
occurring before the adoption of the bylaw could a court lawfully refuse
to enforce it. This is the Galaviz caveat.
Indeed, Boeing Corporation has adopted a forum selection bylaw
with the Galaviz caveat.94 Boeing’s bylaw begins: “With respect to any
action arising out of any act or omission occurring after the adoption of
this By-Law . . . .”95 This language seems to moot the issue in Galaviz,96
and therefore complies with the requirements of federal contract law, as
gleaned above.
CONCLUSION
The emergence of the exclusive forum selection bylaw has brought
the contractarian theory of corporate law into the spotlight. Challenges
to the theory as applied legally—that the bylaw should be viewed in
isolation and require special mutual assent to be enforceable against
stockholders—are, while interesting fodder for academic discussion,
unpersuasive when given a hard look. And practically, these challenges
move us no closer to solving the burgeoning problem of low-value
added, frivolous multijurisdictional stockholder litigation.97
Despite the academic resistance to economic theories premised on
zero to low transaction cost markets, the long-standing legal

94. However, Boeing adopted its bylaw, including the Galaviz caveat, in August
2011, prior to the ruling in Galaviz and the current Chevron litigation. Boeing Co.,
Current Report (Form 8-K) (Aug. 29, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/
edgar/data/12927/000119312511236668/d8k.htm.
95. Boeing Co., Bylaws of the Boeing Co., art. VII, § 4 (Aug. 27, 2012), available
at http://www.boeing.com/corp_gov/bylaws.pdf.
96. CLAUDIA H. ALLEN, NEAL, GERBER & EISENBERG LLP, STUDY OF DELAWARE
FORUM SELECTION IN CHARTERS AND BYLAWS 8 (2012), available at
http://www.ngelaw.com//files/Uploads/Images/StudyofDelawareForum012512.pdf
(“This [Boeing] language seems to respond to the Galaviz opinion . . . .”).
97. Frankel, supra note 11.

2013]

FORUM SELECTION BYLAWS & MUTUAL ASSENT

911

classification of the relationship between the stockholder, her
corporation, and the board as contractual provides a clear answer:
[B]ylaws, together with the certificate of incorporation and the [laws
of the state of incorporation], form part of a flexible contract
between corporations and stockholders, in the sense that the
certificate of incorporation may authorize the board to amend the
bylaws’ terms and that stockholders who invest in such corporations
assent to be bound by board-adopted bylaws when they buy stock in
98
those corporations.

Bylaws are a necessary mechanism built into the contract between
stockholders and boards of almost all US corporations. The bylaw
mechanism gives boards the power to unilaterally draft certain, limited
governing terms, subject to the parameters set by law. Importantly, this
power is specifically granted to boards in their charters—contracts
formed with nearly undisputed and sufficient, albeit non-traditional,
mutual assent. Only when a bylaw attempts to apply retroactively do
stockholders appear to have a colorable claim under federal contract
law.

98.

See Chevron, 2013 WL 3191981, supra note 6, at *2.

